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Applications in risk-critical domains such as emergency management and industrial control systems need 
near real-time stream data processing in large scale sensing networks. The key problem is how to ensure 
online end-to-end security (e.g. confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity) of data streams for such 
applications. We refer to this as an online security verification problem. Existing data security solutions 
cannot be applied in such applications as they cannot deal with data streams with high volume and velocity 
data in real-time. They introduce a significant buffering delay during security verification, resulting in a 
requirement for a large buffer size for the stream processing server. To address this problem, we propose a 
Dynamic Key Length Based Security Framework (DLSeF) based on a shared key derived from synchronized 
prime numbers; the key is dynamically updated at short intervals to thwart potential attacks to ensure end-
to-end security. Theoretical analyses and experimental results of the DLSeF framework show that it can 
significantly improve the efficiency of processing stream data by reducing the security verification time and 
buffer usage without compromising security.  
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 INTRODUCTION 
A variety of applications, such as emergency management, SCADA (Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition), remote health monitoring, telecommunication fraud 
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detection and large scale sensing networks, require real-time processing of data 
streams, where the traditional store-and-process method falls short of the challenge 
[Stonebraker et al. 2005]. These applications have been characterized as producing 
high speed, real-time, sensitive and large volume data input, and therefore require a 
new paradigm of data processing. The data in these applications falls in the big data 
category, as its size is beyond the ability of typical database software tools and 
applications to capture, store, manage and analyze in real time [Manyika et al. 2011]. 
More formally, the characteristics of big data are defined by “4Vs” [Bahrami and 
Singhal 2015; McAfee et al. 2012]: Volume, Velocity, Variety, and Veracity; the 
streaming data from a sensing source meets these characteristics. Our focus in this 
paper is thus on providing end-to-end security for real-time high volume, high velocity 
data streams.    
A big data stream is continuous in nature and it is critical to perform real-time 
analysis as: (i) the lifetime of the data is often very short (i.e. the data can be accessed 
only once) [Bifet 2013; Dayarathna and Suzumura 2013] and (ii) the data is utilized 
for detecting events (e.g. flooding of highways, collapse of railway bridge) in real-time 
in many risk-critical applications (e.g. emergency management). Since a big data 
stream in risk-critical applications has high volume and velocity and the processing 
has to be done in real-time, it is not economically viable and practically feasible to store 
and then process (as done in the traditional batch computing model). Hence, stream 
processing engines (e.g. Spark, Storm, S4) have emerged in the recent past that have 
the capability to undertake real-time big data processing. Stream processing engines 
offer two significant advantages. Firstly, they circumvent the need to store large 
volumes of data and secondly, they enable real-time computation over data as needed 
by emerging applications such as emergency management and industrial control 
systems. Further, integration of stream processing engines with elastic cloud 
computing resources has further revolutionized big data stream computation as 
stream processing engines can now be  easily scaled  [Bifet 2013; Demirkan and Delen 
2013; Tien 2013] in response to changing volume and velocity. 
Although stream data processing has been studied in recent years within the 
database research community, the focus has been on query processing [Deshpande et 
al. 2007], distribution [Sutherland et al. 2005] and data integration. Data security 
related issues, however, have been largely ignored. Many emerging risk-critical 
applications, as discussed above, need to process big streaming data while ensuring 
end-to-end security. For example, consider emergency management applications that 
collect soil, weather, and water data through field sensing devices. Data from these 
sensing devices are processed in real-time to detect emergency events such as sudden 
flooding, and landslides on railways and highways. In these applications, compromised 
data can lead to wrong decisions and in some cases even loss of lives and critical public 
infrastructure. Hence, the problem is how to ensure end-to-end security (i.e. 
confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity) of such data streams in near real-time 
processing. We refer to this as an online security verification problem.  
The problem in processing big data becomes extremely challenging when millions 
of small sensors in self-organizing wireless networks are streaming data through 
intermediaries to the data stream manager. In these cases, intermediaries as well as 
the sensors are prone to different kinds of security attacks such as Man in the Middle 
Attacks. In addition, these sensors have limited processing power, storage, and energy; 
hence, there is a requirement to develop lightweight security verification schemes. 
Furthermore, data streams need to be processed on-the-fly in the correct sequence. In 
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this paper, we address these issues by designing an efficient model for online security 
verification of big data streams.  
The most common approach for ensuring data security is to apply cryptographic 
methods. In the literature, the two most common types of cryptographic encryption 
methods are asymmetric and symmetric key encryption. Asymmetric key encryption 
(e.g. RSA, ElGamal, DSS, YAK, Rabin) performs a number of exponential operations 
over a large finite field and is therefore 1000 times slower than symmetric key 
cryptography [Burke et al. 2000; Cloudflare 2014]. Hence, efficiency becomes an issue 
if an asymmetric key such as Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [Park et al. 2008] is 
applied to securing big data streams. Thus, symmetric key encryption is the most 
efficient cryptographic solution for such applications. However, existing symmetric key 
methods (e.g. DES, AES, IDEA, RC4) fail to meet the requirements of real-time security 
verification of big data streams because the volume and velocity of a big data stream 
is very high (refer to the performance evaluation section for the performance values). 
Hence, there is a need to develop an efficient and scalable model for performing 
security verification of big data streams. The main contributions of the paper can be 
summarized as follows: 
— We have designed and developed a Dynamic Key Length Based Secure Framework 
(DLSeF) to provide end-to-end security for big data stream processing. Our model is 
based on a common shared key that is generated by exploiting synchronized prime 
numbers. The proposed method avoids excessive communication between data 
sources and Data Stream Manager (DSM) for the rekey process. Hence, this leads 
to reduction in the overall communication overhead. Due to this reduced 
communication overhead, our model is able to do security verification on-the-fly 
(with minimum delay) with minimal computational overhead.   
— Our proposed model adopts a moving target approach, using a dynamic key length 
from the set 128-bit, 64-bit, and 32-bit. This enables faster security verification at 
DSM without compromising security. Hence, our model is suitable for processing 
high volumes of data without any delay.  
— We compare our proposed model with the standard symmetric key solution (AES) 
in order to evaluate the relative computational efficiency. The results show that our 
model performs better than the standard AES method.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the background and 
defines the problem space. Related works is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 describes 
our proposed solution, DLSeF. Section 5 presents the formal security analysis of our 
model. Section 6 evaluates the performance and efficiency of the model through 
extensive experiments. Section 7 concludes our work and points out potential future 
directions. 
 BACKGROUND AND THE PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Fig. 1 shows the overall architecture for big data stream processing from source 
sensing devices to the data processing center including our proposed security 
framework. Refer to [Ranjan 2014] for further information on stream data processing 
in datacenter clouds. In sensor networks, data packets from the sources are 
transmitted to the sink (data collector) through multiple intermediary hops (e.g. 
routers and gateways). Collected data at sink nodes are then forwarded to the DSM as 
data streams may also pass through many untrusted intermediaries. The number of 
hops and intermediaries depends on the network architecture designed for a particular 
application. The intermediaries in the network may behave as a malicious attacker by 
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modifying and/or dropping the data packets. Hence, traditional communication 
security techniques [Walters et al. 2007; Perrig et al. 2002; Chen et al. 2009] are not 
sufficient to provide end-to-end security. In our framework, both queries and data 
security related techniques are handled by DSM in coordination with the on-field 
deployed sensing devices. It is important to note that the security verification of 
streaming data has to be performed before the query processing phase and in near 
real-time (with minimal delay) with a fixed (small) buffer size. The processed data are 
stored in the big data storage system supported by cloud infrastructure [Puthal et al. 
2015c]. Queries used in DSM are defined as “continuous” since they are continuously 
applied to the streaming data. Results (e.g. significant events) are pushed to the 
application/user each time the streaming data satisfies a predefined query predicate.  
 
 
Fig. 1. High level of architecture from source sensing device to big data processing center. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Pair of dynamic relative prime number generation, one at the DSM, and another in a distributed 
sensing device are maintained with a standard time interval based on key length. 
 
The discussion of the architecture above clearly identifies the following most 
important requirements for security verification for big data stream processing. In 
summary, they include: (a) the security verification needs to be performed in real time 
(on-the-fly), (b) the framework has to deal with a high volume of data at high velocity, 
(c) the data items should be read once in the prescribed sequence, and (d) the original 
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data is not available for comparisons which are widely available in a store-and-process 
batch processing paradigm. The above requirements need to be met by a big data 
stream processing framework in addition to end-to-end data security.  
Based on the above requirements of big data stream processing, we categorize 
existing data security methods into two classes: communication security [Carman et 
al. 2000; Eschenauer et al. 2002] and server side data security [Zissis and Lekkas 2012; 
Liu et al. 2014]. Communication security deals with the data security between two 
nodes when it is in motion, and does not deal with the end-to-end security, whereas 
server side data security approaches focus on ensuring the security of data when it is 
at rest in a repository [Kandukuri et al. 2009]. The above listed security solutions are 
not suitable to use in the big data stream because of the four important features of big 
data stream stated before. Furthermore, symmetric cryptographic-based security 
solutions are either based on static shared key or centralized dynamic key [Daemen 
and Rijmen 2002; Heron 2009]. In static shared key, we need to have a long key to 
defend against potential attackers. It is well known that the length of the key is always 
proportional to security verification time (see Table 2); hence, longer keys are not 
suitable for applications that need to do real-time processing over high volume, high 
velocity data. For the dynamic key, centralized processors rekey and distribute keys to 
all the sources according to the standard symmetric key solution; this is a time 
consuming process. Moreover, a big data stream is always continuous in nature and it 
is impossible to halt data for a rekeying process. To address this problem, we propose 
a distributed and scalable model for big data stream security verification.  
Our proposed model works as follows: we use a common shared key for both sensing 
devices and DSM. The key is updated dynamically by generating synchronized relative 
prime numbers without further communication between them after handshaking. This 
procedure reduces the communication overhead and increases the efficiency of the 
solution, without compromising security. Due to the reduced communication overhead, 
our model performs the security verification with minimum delay. Based on the shared 
key properties, individual source sensing devices update their dynamic key and key 
length independently.  
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) has been a standard symmetric key 
algorithm since 1977. However, it can be cracked quickly and inexpensively. In 2000, 
the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [Pub, N. F. 2001] replaced the DES to meet 
the ever increasing requirements of data security. The Rijndael algorithm, i.e. 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), is a symmetric block cipher that encrypts data 
blocks of 128 bits using different sizes of symmetric keys such as 128, 192 or 256 bits 
[Pub, N. F. 2001; Simon 2009; Joan and Rijmen 2002]. AES was introduced to replace 
the Triple DES (3DES) algorithm used for a significant time universally. Hence, we 
have compared our proposed solution against AES. 
 RELATED WORK 
Stonebraker et al. [Stonebraker et al. 2005] outlined eight necessities that a framework 
or system ought to meet to exceed expectations at a variety of real-time stream 
processing applications. We found stream data processing and security issues in data 
streams to be one recent research trend. We started working to address the security 
verification in data streams and in this paper we are presenting a novel solution 
towards this problem. In this section, we describe related works under the following 
two areas: stream processing and security solutions for security verification. 
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 Stream Data Processing  
Data streaming has turned into an important research topic for the stream processing 
of continuous data flows in several areas such as finance, telecommunications, and 
networking. The area has gained even more attention from researchers after the 
emergence of big data. Big data is a term connected to data sets whose size is past the 
capacity of accessible devices to attempt their securing, access, investigation or 
application in a sensible timeframe. Recently, it has been estimated that around four 
zettabytes of data are being generated per year from various sources [Tien 2013]. Many 
stream data processing technologies are available in the market. For example, 
StreamCloud is a large scalable elastic data streaming system for processing large data 
streams [Gulisano et al. 2012]. StreamCloud utilizes a novel parallelization strategy 
that splits queries into subqueries that are dispensed to independent sets of nodes in 
a way that minimizes the distribution overhead.  
Arasu et al. initially proposed a Data Stream Management System (DSMS); it is 
called STanford stREam data Manager (STREAM) [Arasu et al. 2003]. It is intended 
to deal with high velocity data rates and substantial numbers of continuous queries 
through cautious resource allocation. Tatbul et al. [Tatbul et al. 2007] demonstrate the 
distributed load shedding issue as a linear optimization problem and propose two 
different solutions: a centralized approach and a distributed approach. The distributed 
approach works in light of metadata aggregation and propagation, whose unified 
execution is additionally accessible. Monitoring applications are those where floods of 
data, triggers, continuous prerequisites, and loose information are pervasive. In 
[Carney et al. 2002], a framework named Aurora is proposed towards observing data 
processing applications. This framework provides existing parts of database 
configuration and usage, additionally obliging creation of novel proactive information 
storage and processing concepts and methods. Chandrasekaran et al. 
[Chandrasekaran et al. 2003] proposed a dataflow system called TelegraphCQ for 
processing continuous queries over data streams. This is a novel architecture to 
support a dynamic query workload in unpredictable data stream situations. There are 
several existing solutions related to data processing but these do not deal with security 
issues.  
  
 Cryptographic Based Data Security  
There are several cryptographic based security solutions, which broadly speaking are 
proposed to solve two different aspects of problems. These two different types of class 
are to protect two different modes of data i.e. communication security and server 
security. Communication security solutions are proposed to protect data when data is 
in motion whereas server security is to protect data when data is at rest. There are 
several security threats and security solutions exist in different communication layers 
[Walters et al. 2007; Chen et al. 2009; Perrig et al. 2002; Eschenauer and Gligor 2002]. 
Data Confidentiality, Data Integrity, Data Freshness, Availability, and Authentication 
are the major security threats and authors also give a clear list of security solutions 
for data communications. Authors also classified the layer-wise security threats and 
existing solutions (i.e. physical layer, data link layer, network layer, transport layer) 
for wireless communication when data is in motion.    
There are numerous possible attacks when data is at rest such as data interruption, 
interception, impersonation, privacy breach, session hijacking, programming flaws, 
software interruption, software modification, defacement, disrupting communications, 
hardware interruption, and hardware modification, etc. Several existing solutions 
have been proposed to overcome these types of attacks as follows: data protection from 
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disclosure, privacy in multitenant environments, application security, access control, 
software security, service availability, data security (data in transit, data at rest, 
reminisce), virtual cloud protection, cloud management control security, hardware 
security, and hardware reliability etc. [Zissis and Lekkas 2012; Liu et al. 2014; 
Kandukuri et al. 2009]. Zissis et al. [Zissis and Lekkas 2012] describe the complete 
architecture of cloud computing, features, services and security and trust related 
issues.  They initially evaluate cloud security and present a feasible solution that 
disposes of these potential threats by identifying unique and novel security 
requirements. They propose security features in a cloud environment by introducing a 
third party and use PKI cryptography to certify the authentication, confidentiality and 
integrity of involved data and communications. Liu et al. [Liu et al. 2014] proposed a 
hierarchical KE scheme, i.e. HKE-BC, which gives more efficient secure scheduling in 
cloud computing environments and also cloud data auditing. It is designed with a two-
phase layer iterative approach and proves the scheme by both theoretical analysis and 
experimental results. It reduces the overall time consumption in AKE without 
sacrificing the level of data security. There are several pieces of research available in 
this area but we are not going into detail. The server side data security (i.e. data is at 
rest) is mainly proposed for physical data center or cloud to access through applications. 
There are also several existing security solutions in streaming environments and 
participatory sensing system [Nehme et al. 2013; Cao et al. 2013; Nehme et al. 2009; 
Wang et al. 2013]. Nehme et al. initially proposed an architecture to address the needs 
of data security and query security in streaming environments [Nehme et al. 2009]. 
They proposed a continuous access control architecture named StreamShield. They 
also proposed another solution named FENCE to solve the problem of continuous 
access control enforcement in data streams [Nehme et al. 2013]. They address security 
for both data and query processing in their solution. ASSIST is a system based access 
control framework to protect streaming data from unauthorized access [Cao et al. 2013]. 
Wang et al. [Wang et al. 2013] proposed a framework, named ARTSense, for 
participatory sensing networks to solve the problem of trust without identity. The 
above solutions are mainly designed for stream environments, and the security 
verification of data streams is not dealt with. Therefore, we focus on security 
verification of big data streams. 
We would like to restate the four important requirements for security verification 
of big data stream processing: (a) near real time security verification, (b) deal with high 
volume and velocity of data, (c) the data items should only be accessed once, and (d) 
the original data is not available for comparisons. Existing solutions for 
communication security or server side security do not satisfy these requirements. Our 
work focuses on addressing all these requirements and we propose a novel light weight 
security model for big data streams. First, we proposed a Dynamic Prime Number 
Based Security Verification (DPBSV) scheme for big data stream processing, which is 
based on a common shared key that is updated dynamically by generating 
synchronized pairs of prime numbers [Puthal et al. 2015a; Puthal et al. 2016]. We 
proved our scheme is efficient by theoretical analyses and experimental results. The 
preliminary version of this paper contains the stream data processing architecture 
security requirements followed by proposal of a novel model to address the online 
security verification by ensuring end-to-end security (e.g. integrity, and authenticity) 
[Puthal et al. 2015b]. In this paper, we propose a new solution for real-time security 
verification (i.e. confidentiality, integrity and authenticity) on big data streams. Our 
model is efficient; we achieved efficiency by reducing the security computation time 
and buffer utilization.  
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 PROPOSED MODEL 
Our model is motivated by the concept of moving target defense. The basic idea is that 
the keys are the targets of attacks by adversaries. If we keep on moving the keys in 
spatial (dynamic key size) and temporal (same key size, but different key) dimensions, 
we can achieve the required efficiency without compromising the security. Our 
proposed model, Dynamic Key Length Based Security Framework (DLSeF), provides 
a robust security solution by changing both key and key length dynamically. In our 
model, if an intruder/attacker eventually hacks the key, the data and time period is 
selected in such a way that he/she cannot predict the key or its length for the next 
session. We argue that it is very difficult for an intruder to guess the appropriate key 
and its length as our model dynamically changes both across the sessions. Though the 
proposed model has weak confidentiality (eventually the intruder may able to detect 
the keys if he/she has sufficient processing and storage capabilities), it provides 
sufficient confidentiality for the duration of online real-time processing. Hence, such a 
weak confidentiality model is sufficient for a disaster management application 
scenario. It is important to note that no compromise is made on the authenticity and 
integrity of the data, which are important for making decisions from the data. 
 
Table I. Notations used in our model 
Acronym Description 
𝑆𝑖   ith source sensing device’s ID 
𝐾𝑖 ith source sensing device’s secret key 
𝐾𝑠𝑖 ith source sensing device’s session key 
𝑘𝑙 Key length  
𝐾1/𝐾2/𝐾3/𝐾4 Initial keys for authentication 
𝐾𝑆𝐻 Secret shared key calculated by the sensing device and DSM 
𝐾𝑆𝐻− Previous secret shared key maintain at DSM 
𝑃1/𝑃2/𝑃3/𝑃4 Communicated format during authentication  
𝑟 Random number generated by the sensing devices 
𝑡 Interval time to generate the prime number 
j Integrity checking interval 
𝑇 Timestamp added with data blocks 
𝑃𝑖 Random prime number 
𝐾𝑑 Secret key of the DSM 
𝐼𝐷 Encrypted data for integrity check 
𝐴𝐷 Secret key for authenticity check 
𝐸( ) Encryption function 
𝐻( ) One-way hash function 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑃𝑖) Random prime number generation function 
KeyGen Key generation procedure 
Key-Length ( ) Key length selection procedure 
⊕ X-OR operation 
∥ Concatenation operation 
𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐴 Fresh data at sensing device before encryption 
 
Similar to any secret key-based symmetric key cryptography, our DLSeF model 
consists of four independent components and related processes: system setup, 
handshaking, rekeying, and security verification. Stream processing is expected to be 
performed in near real-time. The end-to-end delay is an important QoS parameter to 
measure the performance of sensor networks [Akkaya and Younis 2003]. We are 
collecting data from sensor nodes to process for any emergency situation, data need to 
be collected at the DSM in real time. So we assume there should not be much delay on 
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data arrival at the DSM for our model. Table 1 provides the notations used in our 
model. We next describe the model.   
 
 DLSeF System Setup 
We have made a number of realistic and practical assumptions while designing and 
modelling our model. We assume that the DSM has all deployed sensing devices’ 
identities (IDs) and respective secret keys because the network is untrusted. Sensing 
devices and DSM implement some common primitives such as hash function (H( )), 
and common key (K1), which are executed during the initial identification and system 
setup steps.  
The proposed authentication process includes five different steps. The first three 
steps are for the sensing device and DSM authentication process and the final two 
steps are for the session key generation process as shown in Fig. 3. The shared key is 
utilized during the handshaking process.  
Step 1:  
A sensing device (Si) generates a pseudorandom number (r) and encrypts it along 
with its own secret key Ki. The encryption process uses the common shared key (K1), 
which is initialized during the deployment. The output of encryption (EK1(r ∥ Ki)) is 
denoted as P1.  The output is then sent to the DSM: Si → DSM: P1 
Step 2:  
Upon receiving the message, the DSM decrypts P1 (i. e. DK1(P1)) and retrieves the 
corresponding source ID from secret key (𝑆𝑖 ← 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝐾𝑒𝑦(𝐾𝑖)). If the source sensor’s 
ID is found in the database, it accepts; otherwise it rejects. The DSM computes the 
hash of the key to generate another key for encryption K2 ← H(K1). The DSM then 
encrypts the pseudorandom number (r) with the newly generated key as P2 ← EK2(r) 
and sends it to the source sensing device for DSM authentication: Si ← DSM: 𝑃2  
Step 3:  
The corresponding sensing device receives the encrypted pseudorandom number 
and decrypts it to authenticate the DSM, i.e. r′ ← DK2(P2). It calculates the current 
secret shared key using the hash of the existing shared key i.e.K2 ← H(K1). If the 
received random number is the same as the sensor had before (i.e. r = r′), the sensing 
device sends an acknowledgement (ACK) to the DSM. The ACK is encrypted with the 
new key, which is computed using the hash of the current key (K3 ← H(K2)). The 
encrypted ACK is denoted as  P3 ← EK3(ACK), and sent to the DSM: Si → DSM:  𝑃3 
Step 4:  
The DSM decrypts the ACK (i.e. ACK ← DK3(P3)) to confirm that the sensor is now 
ready to establish the session. The current secret key is updated using the hash of the 
existing secret key i.e. K3 ← H(K2). After the confirmation of ACK, the DSM generates 
a random session key i.e. Ksi ← randomKey() for handshaking. The generated session 
key (Ksi) is encrypted with the hash of the current key e.g. (K4← H(K3)) and then sent 
to individual sensors as Si → DSM: { 𝑃4}, where  P4 ← EK4(Ksi).  
Step 5:  
The sensor decrypts P4 and extracts the session key for handshaking (Ksi ← DK4(P4)). 
It follows the same procedure as before, i.e. the current shared key is updated with the 
hash value of the existing shared key (K4← H(K3)). We update the shared key in every 
transaction to ensure the strength of security for handshaking. The complete 
authentication process works as shown in Fig. 3. 
39:10                                                                                                                            D.Puthal et al. 
 
 
ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems, Vol. xx, No. x, Article x, Publication date: Month YYYY 
 
Fig. 3. Secure authentication of Sensor and DSM. 
 
 DLSeF Handshaking  
In the handshaking process, the DSM sends the key generation and synchronization 
properties to sensors based on their individual session key (Ksi) established earlier. 
Generally, a larger prime number is used to strengthen the security process. However, 
a larger prime number requires greater computation time. In order to make the 
rekeying process efficient (lighter and faster), we recommend reducing the prime 
number size. The challenge is how to maintain security while avoiding large prime 
number sizes. We achieve this by dynamically changing the key size as described next.  
 
ALGORITHM 1. Dynamic Prime Number Generation 
Prime (𝑃𝑖) 
1: 𝑃𝑖−1 = 𝑃𝑖 
2: Set 𝑘 ∶= ⌈
𝑃𝑖−1
6
⌉ 
3: Set 𝑚 ∶= 6𝑘 + 1 
4: If 𝑚 ≥ 107 then 
5: 𝑘 ∶= 𝑘
105⁄
 
6: GO TO: 3 
7: If S(𝑚) = 1 then  
8: GO TO: 14 
9: Set 𝑚 ∶= 6𝑘 + 5 
10: If S(𝑚) = 1 then  
11: GO TO: 14 
12: 𝑘 ∶= ⌊𝑘3 + √𝑘⌋ 𝑚𝑜𝑑 17 + 𝑘 
13: GO TO: 3 
14: 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑚 
Return (𝑃𝑖) // calculated new prime number 
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ALGORITHM 2. Synchronization of Dynamic Key Length Generation 
Key-Length (𝑥𝑛−1) 
1: 𝑥𝑛−1← 64 (for first iteration)    
2: 𝑥𝑛 ← 𝑥𝑛−1 + 𝑥𝑛−1 cos 𝑥𝑛−1 
3: i←𝑥𝑛%3 
4: If i = 0 then  
5:   Set kl ← 128  
6:          t ← 720 hours (1 month) 
7:          j ← no checking 
8: Else If i = 1 then 
9:   Set kl ← 64 
10:          t ← 168 hours (1 week) 
11:          j ← Pi % 9  
12: Else 
13:   Set kl ← 32 
14:          t ← 20 hours (1 day) 
15:          j ← Pi % 5 
16: End If  
17: End If  
Return (𝑥𝑛) // use to initialize 𝑥𝑛−1for next iteration. 
 
 
The dynamic prime number generation function is defined in Algorithm 1. This 
algorithm computes the relative prime number, which always depends on the previous 
prime number. This relation between the current and previous prime number process 
helps to synchronize the newly generated prime number. We have given the 
mathematical proofs of Algorithm 1, that the generated number will always be a prime 
number and will synchronize between source device and DSM (refer to Theorem 2). We 
calculate the prime number and shared key on both sensing sources and DSM ends to 
reduce communication overhead and minimize the chances of disclosing the shared key. 
The computed shared keys have multiple lengths (32 bit, 64 bit, and 128 bit) which are 
varied across the sessions. Initial key length is set to 64 bit and is dynamically updated 
as per the logic depicted in Algorithm 2. This algorithm selects the key length and the 
associated time interval to generate the shared key. The key and key length selection 
process follows based on the time taken to find all possible keys in the key domain by 
following Table II. In Table II, we compute the key domain size and time required to 
find all possible keys for different key lengths (i.e. 8, 16, 32, 64, and 128) by using the 
most advanced Intel i7 processor. So Algorithm 2 follows the properties from Table II 
to initialize the rekeying time interval according to the key length. After the time 
interval, the next shared key is generated by applying Algorithm 1 where the size is 
determined by Algorithm 2 as follows:   
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑃𝑖) periodically computes the relative prime number at both the sensor and 
DSM ends  after a time interval t, which is updated based on function 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ( ).  
The shared secret key (𝐾𝑆𝐻) generation process needs 𝐾𝑑 , and 𝑃𝑖. In the handshaking 
process, the DSM transmits all properties required to generate a shared key to 
sensors  (𝐾𝑑 , 𝑡,  𝑃𝑖 , 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒 ( ), 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ( ),  𝐾𝑆𝐻 , 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝐺𝑒𝑛)  as follows: Si ← DSM: 
{ 𝐸𝐾𝑠𝑖(𝐾𝑑 , 𝑡, 𝑃𝑖 , 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒 ( ), 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ( ), 𝐾𝑆𝐻 , 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝐺𝑒𝑛)}    
All of the transferred information outlined above is stored in the trusted part of the 
source for future rekeying processes (e.g. TPM) [Nepal et al. 2011].   
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 DLSeF Rekeying  
Our proposed model not only calculates the dynamic prime number to update the 
shared key without further communication after handshaking, but also proposes a 
novel way of dynamically changing key length at source and DSM according to steps 
described in Algorithm 2. We change the key periodically in the DLSeF Rekeying 
process to ensure that the protocol remains secured. If there are any types of key or 
data compromise at a source, the corresponding sensor is desynchronized with DSM 
instantly. Following that the source sensor needs to reinitialize and synchronize with 
DSM as described above. We assume that the secret information is stored in the 
trusted part of the sensor (e.g. TPM) and it is sent by the sensor to DSM for 
synchronization. According to the properties of the TPM, no one has access to the 
information stored inside the TPM. Only the sensor can access TPM properties. Even 
if the sensor is destroyed, an adversary cannot get the information from the trusted 
module of the sensor (i.e. TPM). In some cases, a data packet can arrive at DSM after 
the shared key is updated. Such data packets are encrypted using the previous shared 
key. We add a time stamp field to individual data packets to identify the encrypted 
shared key. If the data is encrypted using the previous key then DSM uses 𝐾𝑆𝐻− key 
for the security verification; otherwise, it follows the normal process.  
The above defined DLSeF Handshaking process makes sensors aware of the Prime 
(Pi), KeyLength, and KeyGen. We now describe the complete secure data transmission 
and verification process using those functions and keys. As mentioned above, our 
model uses the synchronized dynamic prime number generation Prime (Pi) on both 
sides, i.e. sensors and DSM, as shown in Fig. 2. At the end of the handshaking process, 
sensors have their own secret keys, initial prime number and initial shared key 
generated by the DSM. The next prime generation process is based on the current 
prime number and the time interval as described in Algorithm 1. The prime number 
generation process (Algorithm 1) always calls Algorithm 2 to fetch the shared key 
length information and associated time interval. Sensors generate the shared key 
𝐾𝑆𝐻=(𝐸(𝑃𝑖,𝐾𝑑)) using the prime number 𝑃𝑖, and the DSM’s secret key 𝐸(P𝑖,𝐾𝑑). We use 
the secret key of DSM to improve the robustness of the security verification process. 
We fixed the initial key length at 64 bits and 168 hours as the initial time interval for 
rekeying. Each data block is associated with the authentication and integration tag 
and contains two different parts. One is encrypted DATA based on shared key 𝐾𝑆𝐻 for 
integrity checking (i.e. 𝐼𝐷=𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐴⊕𝐾𝑆𝐻), and the other is for authenticity checking (i.e. 
𝐴𝐷=𝑆𝑖⊕𝐾𝑆𝐻). The resulting data block ((DAT𝐴⊕𝐾𝑆𝐻) ∥ (𝑆𝑖⊕𝐾𝑆𝐻)) is sent to DSM as 
follows: Si → DSM: {(𝐼𝐷∥(𝐴𝐷∥T))}. The time stamp which indicates the encrypted 
shared keys is always associated with the authentication part. We prefer to add the 
time stamp with the authentication part because the DSM can easily identify the data 
block if it is encrypted with the previous shared key. More details about the time stamp 
are described in the following subsection and the complete procedure of the key 
generation (rekeying) process is shown in Algorithm 3. This algorithm takes 
information from Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 to in order to perform the rekeying 
process. From Algorithm 1, Algorithm 3 takes the dynamic prime number (𝑃𝑖 ) to 
compute a shared key 𝐾𝑆𝐻 and from Algorithm 2, it takes the key size and time interval 
for the rekeying process.   
 
 DLSeF Key Synchronization  
Synchronization is one of the major issues during the rekeying process between sensors 
and the DSM. The shared key synchronization is based on the time interval set during 
the key length selection and key generation process. In our model, we define the time 
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stamp as T, which is concatenated with encrypted data blocks that are sent to the DSM. 
The time initialization or interval to generate the shared key always maintains local 
time, i.e. t1, t2, t3 …, i.e. each site maintains its own time and increases it when the 
new key is generated. That means the time slot associated with key generation changes 
only when the key is changed.    
 The time slot appended with encrypted data blocks is used to identify the shared 
key by the DSM. When the DSM receives data blocks with the time stamp tn, and it 
finds that the current time stamp is tn+1, then it decrypts the data blocks with the 
previous shared key i.e. 𝐾𝑆𝐻− as stated earlier. This time is updated on both ends after 
the interval of time, but DSM keeps the immediate previous time stamps with 
associate shared keys to decrypt data blocks which arrive after the shared keys are 
updated. The time duration to generate the key (rekeying) always depends on the key 
length selected by both sensors and DSM as in Algorithm 2. The generated shared keys 
are always synchronized because the key generation properties reside on both DSM 
and sensor. The prime number plays a vital role in synchronizing the shared key 
generation process, and the prime number will always be the same for both DSM and 
sensors (see Theorem 2).  
In some adverse or natural disaster situations, source sensing devices may be lost or 
desynchronize with the shared key. In such situations, a source device starts the 
process from the beginning by sending its identification details to the DSM. If the DSM 
finds the received message is from an authenticated node, then it pass the current 
shared key along with its properties to the source device. Source devices can use the 
current key and time interval to encrypt the data blocks and perform the rekeying 
process. The key generation/rekeying process cannot be disclosed to anyone in any 
circumstances because we use the TPM at the source device to protect the rekey 
process. A TPM is a dedicated security chip following the trust computing standard 
specification for cryptographic microcontroller systems and provides hardware-based 
trust, which contains cryptographic functionality like key generation, store, and 
management in hardware.  
 
ALGORITHM 3. Key Generation (Rekeying) Process at Sensor(Si) and DSM(D) 
 
1. Session key (𝐾𝑆𝑖) from Fig. 3 
2. Dynamic prime number (𝑃𝑖) computed from Algorithm 1. 
3. Time interval (T) computed from algorithm 2. 
3.1 T= {t1, t2, t3, …} 
Here t1, t2, t3, … are the time intervals of key generation. 
3.2 Sensor (𝑆𝑖) and DSM (D) update the key after the time interval from 
Algorithm 2. 
4. As stated before sensor and DSM have properties like H( ), E. The new key generation 
𝐾𝑆𝐻= 𝐸𝐾𝑆𝐻(H(𝑃𝑖, 𝐾𝑑)). 
5. The encryption process at sensor happens in two steps 
5.1 𝐼𝐷=𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐴⊕𝐾𝑆𝐻 
5.2 𝐴𝐷=𝑆𝑖⊕𝐾𝑆𝐻 
6. Si → DSM: {(ID∥(AD∥T))} 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39:14                                                                                                                            D.Puthal et al. 
 
 
ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems, Vol. xx, No. x, Article x, Publication date: Month YYYY 
Algorithm 4. Security Framework for Big Sensor Data Stream 
Description Based on the prime number generation on both sensor and DSM ends, 
the proposed dynamic key length based security framework of big data 
stream works more efficiently than before without compromising 
security. 
Input the prime generation process 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑃𝑖),  
key length generation process   Key-Length (𝑥𝑛−1),  
key generation process 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝐺𝑒𝑛, and session key 𝐾𝑒𝑛𝑐. 
Output Successful security verification without detecting any malicious attacks. 
Step 1 DLSeF System setup 
1.1 Si → DSM: {EK1(r ∥ Ki)}, ith sensor sends the random number with its identity which 
is encrypted with common shared key i.e. K1. 
1.2 Si ← DSM: { 𝐸𝐾2(𝑟)}, DSM identifies the sensor and generates a new key which is 
the hash of current key for encryption K2 ← H(K1). Then DSM encrypts the random 
number and sends back to the ith sensor  
1.3 Si → DSM: { 𝐸𝐾3(𝐴𝐶𝐾)}, ith sensor identifies the DSM by decrypting the packet. If 
sender is authenticated then it performs the hash of the current key (K3 ← H(K2)) 
to get a new key for encryption and sends back the acknowledgement.  
1.4 Si ← DSM: { 𝐸𝐾4(𝐾𝑆𝑖)} DSM authenticates the last transaction and sends back to ith 
sensor with this format. DSM generates a session key Ksi ← randomKey() and 
encrypts with the newly generated key (k4) with the hash function of current key 
(k3). 
1.5 Sensor authenticates the packet and gets the session key for handshaking (Ksi ← 
DK4(P4)).  
Step 2 DLSeF Handshaking 
DSM sends its properties to individual sensors based on their individual session 
key. It includes the prime number generation and time interval to generation etc. 
2.1 DSM ← Si: {𝐸𝐾𝑠𝑖(𝐾𝑑 , 𝑡, 𝑃𝑖 , 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑃𝑖), 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ ( ), 𝐾𝑆𝐻, 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝐺𝑒𝑛)} 
Step 3 DLSeF Rekeying 
Key updates on both source sensor and DSM and both are aware about the Prime 
(Pi) and KeyGen. Sensors generate the shared key   𝐾𝑆𝐻 = 𝐻(𝐸(𝑃𝑖 , 𝐾𝑑)) and each data 
block is associated with two different parts. One is encrypted i.e. 𝐼𝐷 = 𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐴 ⊕ 𝐾𝑆𝐻 
and the other is for authenticity checking i.e., 𝐴𝐷 = 𝑆𝑖 ⊕ 𝐾𝑆𝐻. 
3.1 Si → DSM: {  𝐸𝑘(𝐼𝐷 ∥ (𝐴𝐷 ∥ 𝑇)) }, these blocks for Authentication, integration, 
confidential check, and Time stamp for synchronization. 
Step 4 DLSeF Security Verification 
The DSM checks for authenticity in each data block 𝐴𝐷 and checks for the integrity 
with random interval data blocks 𝐼𝐷 and random value is calculated based on the 
corresponding prime number.  
4.1 DSM checks the timestamp (T) at every packet to get the key for decryption. If the 
timestamp is not the current one then it decrypts with 𝐾𝑆𝐻−.      
4.2  𝑆𝑖 = 𝐴𝐷 ⊕ 𝐾𝑆𝐻 
For the authenticity check, the DSM gets the source ID. Once Si is obtained, the DSM 
checks the source database and extracts the corresponding secret key 𝐾𝑖  for the 
integrity check according to the value of j.  
4.3 𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐴 = 𝐼𝐷 ⊕ 𝐾𝑆𝐻 
DSM calculates/decrypts data and checks MAC for integrity. 
 
 DLSeF Security Verification  
In this step, the DSM first checks the authenticity in each individual data block 𝐴𝐷 and 
then the integrity with randomly selected data blocks 𝐼𝐷. The random value is 
calculated based on the corresponding prime number i.e. 𝑗=𝑃𝑖% 5, when the key length 
is 32; 𝑗=𝑃𝑖% 9 when the key length is 64; and there is no integrity verification when the 
key length is 128. We differ the integrity verification interval randomly for individual 
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key lengths. We prefer to change the integrity verification interval more frequently 
when the key length is shorter because key length is inversely proportional to 
possibilities to read/modify the data. As the key length 128 is computationally hard 
and can last for a long time, we do not check the integrity verification. We update the 
shared key before there is a possibility of attack. The DSM also checks the time stamp 
of each individual data block to find the shared key used for encryption. For the 
authenticity check, the DSM decrypts 𝐴𝐷 with shared key 𝑆𝑖=𝐴𝐷⊕𝐾𝑆𝐻. Once Si is 
obtained, the DSM checks its source database and extracts the corresponding secret 
key 𝐾𝑖 (𝐾𝑖 ← 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝐾𝑒𝑦(𝑆𝑖 )). In the integrity check process, the DSM decrypts the 
selected data such as 𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐴=𝐼𝐷⊕𝐾𝑆𝐻 to get the original data and checks MAC for data 
integrity.  
The complete mechanism beginning from source and DSM authentication to 
handshaking and security verification as mentioned in algorithmic format is shown in 
Algorithm 4. Algorithm 4 represents the description of the proposed mechanism as a 
stepwise process.  
 SECURITY ANALYSIS OF DLSEF 
In this section, we provide a theoretical analysis of our model. We made the following 
assumptions: (a) any participant in our scheme cannot decrypt the data that was 
encrypted by the DLSeF algorithm unless it has the shared key which was used to 
encrypt the data; (b) as DSM is located at the big data processing system side, we 
assume that DSM is fully trusted and no one can attack it; and (c) a  sensors’ secret 
key, Prime (Pi) and secret key calculation procedures reside inside the trusted part of 
the sensor (such as the TPM) so that they are not accessible to intruders.   
Similar to most security analyses of communication protocols, we now define the 
attack models for the purpose of verifying confidentiality, authenticity and integrity. 
 
 Security Proof 
Definition 1 (attack on authentication). A malicious attacker Ma can attack the 
authenticity if it is capable of monitoring, intercepting, and introducing itself as an 
authenticated source node to send data in the data stream. 
 
Definition 2 (attack on integrity). A malicious attacker Mi can attack the integrity if it 
is an adversary capable of monitoring the data stream regularly and trying to access 
and modify a data block before it reaches the DSM.  
  
Definition 3 (attack on confidentiality): A malicious attacker Mc is an unauthorized 
party which has ability to access or view the unauthorized data stream before it 
reaches the DSM (within the time bound). 
 
Theorem 1: The security is not compromised by changing the size of shared key (KSH). 
Proof: The dynamic prime number generation generates and updates the key on both 
sensor and DSM. The dynamic shared key length is 32 bit or 64 bit or 128 bit. The 
ECRYPT II recommendations on key length say that a 128-bit symmetric key provides 
the same strength of protection as a 3,248-bit asymmetric key [Cloudflare 2014]. An 
even smaller symmetric key provides more security as it is never shared publicly. An 
advanced processor (Intel i7 Processor) took about 1.7 nanoseconds to try out one key 
from one block. With this speed it would take about 1.3 × 1012 × the age of the universe 
to check all the keys from the possible key set [Cloudflare 2014]. By reducing the size 
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of the prime number, we vary the key length to confuse the adversary, but achieve 
faster security verification at DSM using the data reported in Table 2. Further, Table 
2 shows that a 128 bit symmetric key takes 3136e +19 nanoseconds (more than a 
month), a 64 bit symmetric key takes 3136e +19 nanoseconds (more than a week), and 
so on. We fixed the time interval (t) to generate prime numbers and updated the shared 
key as follows: t=720 hours for 128-bit key length, t=168 hours for 64-bit length, and 
t=20 hours for 32-bit length key (see Algorithm 2). The dynamic shared key is computed 
based on the calculated prime number and associated properties initialized accordingly 
(see Algorithm 1). Based on these calculation, we conclude that an attacker cannot 
intercept within the interval time t. The key has already been changed four times 
before an attacker knows the key and this fact is not known to the attackers. Data 
blocks arriving after 20 hours are discarded as they might be compromised.   
 
Table II. Time taken by symmetric key (AES) algorithm to get all possible keys using the most advanced Intel i7 
Processor. 
Key Length 8 16 32 64 128 
Key domain size 256 65536 4.295e+09 1.845e +19 3.4028e+38 
Time (in nanoseconds) 1435.2 1e+05 7.301e+09 3136e +19 5.7848e+35 
 
Theorem 2:  Relative prime number Pi as calculated in Algorithm 1 is always 
synchronized between the source sensors (Si) and DSM.     
Proof: The normal method to check the prime number is 6k+1, ∀k∈ N+ (an integer). 
Here, we first initialize the value of k based on this primary test formula stated above. 
Our prime number generation method is based on the nth prime number generation 
concept and from the extended idea of [Kaddoura and Abdul-Nabi 2012]. In our model, 
the input Pi is the currently used prime number (initialized by DSM) and the return 
Pi is the calculated new prime number. Intially Pi is initialized by DSM at the DLSeF 
Handshaking process and the interval time is t (see Algorithm 2). 
By applying Algorithm 1, we calculate the new prime number 𝑃𝑖  based on the 
previous one 𝑃𝑖−1 . The complete process of the prime number calculation and 
generation is based on the value of m, where m is initialized from k. The value of k is 
kept constant at source because it is calculated from the current prime number. This 
is initialized during DLSeF Handshaking. Since k is constant, the procedure Prime (Pi) 
returns identical values at both source sensors and DSM. In Algorithm 1, the value of 
S(x) is computed as follows, if the computed value is 1 then x is a prime; otherwise it 
is not a prime.  
S1(𝑥) =
(−1)
⌊
⌊√𝑥⌋
6
⌋+1
∑ ⌊⌊
𝑥
6𝑘+1
⌋ −
𝑥
6𝑘+1
⌋
⌊
⌊√𝑥⌋
6
⌋+1
𝑘=1  , 
S2(𝑥) =
(−1)
⌊
⌊√𝑥⌋
6
⌋+1
∑ ⌊⌊
𝑥
6𝑘−1
⌋ −
𝑥
6𝑘−1
⌋
⌊
⌊√𝑥⌋
6
⌋+1
𝑘=1   
𝑆(𝑥) =
S1(x)+S2(x)
2
  
If 𝑆(𝑥) = 1 then x is prime, otherwise x is not a prime.  
𝑥 ≢ 0 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑖 ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ x − 1, if x is prime. 
Put the value of x as a prime number, then derivations as follows:  
⇒ ⌊⌊
x
6k+1
⌋ −
x
6k+1
⌋ = −1     
Same as ⌊⌊
x
6k−1
⌋ −
x
6k−1
⌋ = −1  
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∀ k within the specified range i.e 107, then 
S1(𝑥) =
(−1)
⌊
⌊√𝑥⌋
6
⌋+1
∑ (−1)
⌊
⌊√𝑥⌋
6
⌋+1
𝑘=1 =  1  
Same S2(𝑥) is also 1 and then  𝑆(𝑥) =
S1(x)+S2(x)
2
= 1 
Hence, the property of 𝑆(𝑥) is proved.    
 
Theorem 3: An attacker Ma cannot read the secret information from a sensor node (Si) 
or introduce itself as an authenticated node in DLSeF. 
Proof: Following Definition 1 and considering the computational hardness of a secure 
module (such as TPM), we know that Ma cannot get the secret information for Pi 
generation, Ki and KeyGen. So there are no possibilities for the malicious node to trap 
the sensor, but Ma can introduce him/herself as an authenticated node to send its 
information. In our model, a sensor (Si) sends ((𝐼𝐷) ∥ (𝐴𝐷)), where the second part of 
the data block (𝑆𝑖 ⊕ 𝐾𝑆𝐻) is used for an authentication check. The DSM decrypts this 
part of the data block for the authentication check. The DSM retrieves Si after 
decryption and matches corresponding Si within its database. If the calculated Si 
matches with the DSM database, it accepts; otherwise it rejects the node as source and 
it is not an authenticated sensor node. Hence, we conclude that an attacker Ma cannot 
attack the big data stream. 
 
Theorem 4: An attacker Mc cannot access or view the unauthorized data stream in our 
proposed DLSeF within the time bound. 
Proof: Following Algorithm 1, it is clear that the prime numbers 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒 (𝑃𝑖)  are 
generated at sensors and DSM dynamically without any further communication. 
Shared secret key 𝐾𝑆𝐻 is calculated based on the generated prime number. Considering 
the computational hardness of secure modules (such as TPM), we know that Mc cannot 
get the secret information such as Pi generation, Ki and KeyGen within the time frame. 
Following Definition 2, we know that an attacker Mc can gain access to the shared key 
𝐾𝑆𝐻 but no other information. In our scheme, source sensor (Si) sends data blocks in 
the format ((𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐴 ⊕ 𝐾𝑆𝐻 ⊕ 𝐾𝑖) ∥ (𝑆𝑖 ⊕ 𝐾𝑆𝐻)), where the first part of the data block 
(𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐴 ⊕ 𝐾𝑆𝐻 ⊕ 𝐾𝑖)  contains the original data. Getting the original data (𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐴)  is 
impossible from this because Mc  does not have other information and at the same time 
the shared key 𝐾𝑆𝐻  is updated dynamically in the interval of time (t). If Mc has 
sufficient processing and storage capabilities, it may be able to get the shared key, but 
in the meantime our shared key must be changed. In such a case, Mc can read the 
message. This does not affect the application we are focusing on (e.g. disaster 
management) by stream data processing. So our model DLSeF provides weak 
confidentiality by not breaking the confidentiality in real time.  
 
Theorem 5: An attacker Mi cannot read the shared key 𝐾𝑆𝐻 within the time interval t 
in the DLSeF model.  
Proof: Following Definition 2, we know that an attacker Mi has full access to the 
network to read the shared key 𝐾𝑆𝐻, but Mi cannot get correct secret information such 
as KSH. Considering the method described in Theorem 1, we know that Mi cannot get 
the currently used KSH within the time interval t (see Table 2), because our proposed 
model calculates Pi randomly after time t and then uses the value Pi to generate KSH as 
described in Theorems 1 and 2.  
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Theorem 6: The proposed DLSeF requires a comparatively smaller buffer size than 
standard symmetric key solutions for security verification.  
Proof: Following Algorithm 3, it is clear that the proposed DLSeF is a lightweight 
security model for security verification. We are decrypting the identity of sensing 
devices for authentication checks from every data block, whereas the selected data 
block decrypts for integrity checks. Another important mechanism is the key length 
used for encryption/decryption. As we are using the smaller key length to encrypt the 
data blocks, it also makes the security verification faster. These above two processes 
make the security verification much faster than other security mechanisms. As we all 
know, the speed of the security verification is directly proportional to the required 
buffer size. Finally, we conclude that the proposed DLSeF model for security 
verification needs a comparatively smaller buffer size. The evaluation proof is in the 
following section.  
 
 Forward Secrecy 
As with other symmetric key procedures, shared keys used for encrypting 
communications are only used for a certain period of time (t) until the new prime 
number is generated. Thus, a previously used shared key or secret keying material is 
useless to a malicious attacker even if a secret key used in a previous session is known 
to the attackers. This is one of the major advantages of frequent changing of the shared 
key. In our model, we change the key with different key lengths. This is one of the 
reasons we did not choose static symmetric key cryptography or an asymmetric-key 
encryption algorithm. 
 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
The proposed DLSeF security model, though deployed in a big sensor data stream in 
this paper, is a generic approach and can be used in other application domains. In 
order to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed architecture and 
protocol, even under adverse conditions, we experimented with different approaches 
in multiple simulation environments. We first measure the performance of sensor 
nodes by using a COOJA simulator in Contiki OS [Contiki 2015]; second, we verify the 
proposed security approach using Scyther [Scyther 2015]; third, we measure the 
performance of the approach using JCE (Java Cryptographic Environment) [Pistoia et 
al. 2004]; finally, we compute the minimum buffer size required to process our proposed 
approach by using MatLab [Matlab 2015] in-order to measure the efficiency of our 
method.  
 
 Sensor Node Performance 
We tested the performance of sensors in a COOJA simulator in Contiki OS to measure 
the performance of sensors while running the proposed security verification model. We 
took the two most common types of sensor, i.e. Z1 and TmoteSky sensors, for our 
experiment and performance checking as shown in Fig. 4. In this experiment, we 
checked the performance of sensors while computing or updating the shared key and 
the highest possible number of shared key generation with specified energy level. 
Initially all sensor nodes have the same level of energy, 1.6 joule. [Kulik et al. 2002]. 
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(a) (b) 
Fig. 4. The sensors used for experiment (a) Z1 low power sensor. (b) TmoteSky ultra low power sensor. 
 
  
(a) (b) 
Fig. 5. Performance computation of two different sensors (a) Estimated power consumption during the 
key generation process. (b) Possible number of key generation with initial 1.6 J power of sensors. 
  
Z1 sensor nodes are produced by Zolertia and are a low-power WSN module, 
designed as a universal purpose development platform for sensor network researchers. 
Most of the WSN communities prefer this because it supports most employed open 
source operating systems, like Contiki. COOJA is a network simulator for Contiki, 
which provides real time sensor node features for simulation.  
The Z1 sensor is equipped with the low power microcontroller MSP430F2617, which 
has features like a powerful 16-bit RISC CPU @16MHz clock speed, 8KB RAM, built-
in clock factory calibration, and a 92KB Flash memory. Z1 hardware selection always 
guarantees robustness and maximum efficiency with low energy cost. Similarly, 
TmoteSky is an ultra-low power sensor. It is equipped with the low power 
microcontroller MSP430F1611, which has built-in clock factory calibration, 10KB 
RAM and a 48KB Flash memory. 
From the features of the above two types of sensors, we successfully established in 
the COOJA Simulator that our key generation process works successfully in both types 
of sensors i.e. z1 sensor and TmoteSky sensor. These sensors can easily support our 
security approach. The energy consumption during the key generation process is 
shown in Fig. 5(a), and the maximum number of possible key generations in Fig. 5(b). 
On average, the above sensors can generate the shared key around 280 times which 
can support over a year to perform security mechanism. From this experiment, we 
conclude that our proposed security verification approach DLSeF is supported by most 
common types of sensors (tested with Z1 and TmoteSky sensors) and feasible for big 
sensing data streams to work for longer times.   
 
 Security Verification  
The protocols in our proposed model are written in a Scyther simulation environment 
using Security Protocol Description Language (.spdl). According to the features of 
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Scyther, we define the roles of S and D, where S is the sender (i.e. sensor nodes) and D 
is the recipient (i.e. DSM). In our scenario, S and D have all the required information 
that is exchanged during the handshake process. This enables S and D to update their 
own shared key. S sends the data packets to D and D performs the security verification. 
In our simulation, we introduce three types of attack by adversaries. In the first type 
of attack, a malicious attacker changes the data while it is being transmitted from S 
to D through intermediaries (integrity attack).  In the second type of attack 
(authentication attack), an adversary acquires the property of S and sends the data 
packets to D pretending that it is from S. In the third type of attack (attack on 
confidentiality), an adversary gets the data block to analyze and tries to read the data 
within the time bound. We experimented with 100 runs for each claim and found no 
attacks at D as shown in Fig. 6. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Scyther simulation environment with parameters and results page of successful security 
verification at DSM 
 
Experiment model: In practice, attacks may be more sophisticated and efficient than 
brute force attacks. However, this does not affect the validity of the proposed DLSeF 
model as we are interested in efficient security verification without periodic key 
exchanges and successful attacks. Here, we model the process as described in the 
previous section and vary the key size between 32 bits, 64 bits, and 128 bits (see Table 
2). We used Scyther, an automatic security protocol verification tool, to verify our 
proposed model. 
Results: We did our simulation using a different number of data blocks in each run. 
Our experiment ranged from 10 to 100 instances with 10 intervals. We checked 
authentication for each data block, whereas the integrity check is performed on the 
selected data blocks. As the key generation process is saved in the trusted part of the 
sensors, no one can get access to that information except the corresponding sensor. 
Hence, we did not find any authentication attacks. For integrity attacks, it is hard to 
get the shared key (𝐾𝑆𝐻), as we frequently change the shared key (𝐾𝑆𝐻) and its length 
based on the dynamic prime number 𝑃𝑖 on both source sensor (𝑆𝑖) and DSM. In the 
experiment, we did not encounter any integrity attacks. Fig. 6 shows the result of 
security verification experiments in the Scyther environment. This shows that our 
model is secured from integrity and authentication attacks.  
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 Performance Comparison 
Experiment model: It is clear that the actual efficiency improvement brought by our 
model is highly dependent on the size of the key and rekeying without further 
communication between sensor and DSM. We have performed experiments with 
different sizes of data block. The results of our experiments are given below.  
We compare the performance of our proposed model DLSeF with advanced encryption 
standard (AES), and our previously proposed model for big sensing data stream 
(DPBSV), the standard symmetric key encryption algorithm [Pub, N. F. 2001; Simon 
2009]. Our model is efficient compared with DPBSV and two standard symmetric key 
algorithms, 128-bit AES and 256-bit AES. This performance comparison experiment 
was carried out in JCE (Java Cryptographic Environment). We compared the 
processing time with different data block sizes. This comparison is based on the 
features of JCE in Java virtual machine version 1.6 64 bit. JCE is the standard 
extension to the Java platform which provides a framework implementation for 
cryptographic methods. We experimented with many-to-one communication. All sensor 
nodes communicate to the single node (DSM). All sensors have similar properties 
whereas the destination node has more power to initialize the process (DSM). The 
rekey process is executed at all the nodes without any intercommunication. The 
processing time of data verification is measured at the DSM node. Our experimental 
results are shown in Fig. 7.  
Results: The performance of our model is better than the standard AES algorithm 
when different sizes of data blocks are considered. Fig. 7 shows the processing time of 
the DLSeF model in comparison with base 128-bit AES, and 256-bit AES for different 
sizes of data blocks. The performance comparison shows that our proposed model is 
efficient and faster than the baseline AES protocols. 
From the above two experiments, we conclude that our proposed DLSeF model is 
secured (from both authenticity and integrity attacks), and efficient (compared to 
standard symmetric algorithms such as 128-bit AES and 256-bit AES).   
 
Fig. 7. Performance comparison of our scheme with DPBSV and standard AES algorithm i.e. 128 bit AES 
and 256 bit AES. 
39:22                                                                                                                            D.Puthal et al. 
 
 
ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems, Vol. xx, No. x, Article x, Publication date: Month YYYY 
 
 Buffer size Utilization  
Experiment model: We experimented with the features of the DSM buffer by using 
MATLAB as the simulation tool [Matlab 2015]. This performance is based on the 
processing time performance calculated in Fig. 8. Here we compared our scheme with 
DPBSV and standard 128-bit AES and 256-bit AES, the same as the processing time 
performance comparison. The minimum size of buffer required to process security 
verification at DSM with various data rates starts from 50 to 250 MB/S with a 50 MB/S 
interval. Here we compare the efficiency of our proposed scheme (DLSeF).  
 
Fig. 8. Efficiency comparison of minimum buffer size required to process the security verification with 
various data rates to DSM. 
 
Results: The performance of our scheme is better than the standard AES algorithm 
with different rates of data. Fig. 8 shows the minimum buffer size required to process 
security at the DSM and proposed DLSeF scheme performance compared with DPBSV 
and base symmetric key solutions such as 128-bit AES and 256-bit AES. The 
performance comparison shows that our proposed scheme is efficient and requires less 
buffer to process security than previous protocols.  
From all the above experiments, we conclude that our proposed DLSeF model is 
secured (from authenticity, confidentiality, and integrity attacks), and efficient 
(compare to standard symmetric algorithms such as 128-bit AES and 256-bit AES and 
DPBSV).  We also show that the proposed model needs less buffer during the security 
verification.   
 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we have proposed a novel authenticated key exchange protocol, namely 
Dynamic Key Length Based Security Framework (DLSeF), which aims to provide a 
real-time security verification model for big sensing data streams. Our model has been 
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designed based on symmetric key cryptography and dynamic key length to provide 
more efficient security verification of big sensing data streams. Our proposed model is 
designed by two dimensional security i.e. not only the dynamic key but also the dynamic length of 
the key. By theoretical analyses and experimental evaluations, we showed that our 
DLSeF model has provided significant improvement in the security processing time, 
and prevented malicious attacks on authenticity, integrity and weak confidentiality. 
In our model, we decrease the communication and computation overhead by 
performing dynamic key initialization along with dynamic key size at both source 
sensing devices and DSM, which in effect eliminates the need for rekeying and 
decreases the communication overhead. The proposed security verification model is 
implemented before stream data processing (i.e. DSM) as shown in our architecture 
diagram. Several applications such as disaster management, event detection etc. need 
to filter the modified and corrupted data before stream data processing. These types of 
applications need only original and unmodified data for analysis to detect the event. 
The proposed DLSeF model performs security verification in near real time to 
synchronize with the performance speed of the stream processing engine. Our major 
concern is not to degrade the performance of stream processing by performing security 
verification near real time. Although the efficiency of big data stream security 
verification benefits greatly from an efficient AES and DPBSV scheme such as DLSeF, 
this is still not fast enough when verifying data blocks while maintaining as much data 
security and privacy as possible.  
In the future, we plan to pursue a number of research avenues to improve the 
performance of the security verification on big data streams. In addition, we will 
perform a comparative study of our work with other symmetric key techniques like 
RC5 and RC6. We will further develop and investigate the technique for a moving target 
defence strategy for the Internet of Things. 
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